

ARGUMENTATIVE TOPOI SEEN FROM A DISCOURSE ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE

CHIARA DEGANO
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI ROMA TRE

Abstract – One core aspect of argumentation is the inferential reasoning that justifies the transition from the premises to the conclusion. Classical rhetoric accounted for such inference in terms of *topoi* (or topics), while contemporary approaches have introduced the notion of argumentation schemes, even if the two concepts still largely coexist. Different approaches exist to the analysis and classification of topoi/schemes. This paper ponders on how two different approaches, the *Argomentum* Model of Topics (AMT) and the pragma-dialectical account of schemes, can serve the purposes of discourse analysts interested in argumentation. While discourse analysis tends to approach topoi from a content-based perspective, in this paper the view is taken that relying on more formalised accounts may add methodological rigour to the analysis of real-life argumentation, while enhancing points of contact between discourse analysis and argumentation theory. In particular, the AMT and the pragma-dialectical schemes are applied to the analysis of arguments used in editorials on Brexit, with a focus on populism. Building on a previous study in which recurrent topoi were analysed drawing on a content-based approach, this paper will try to establish connections between the topoi thus identified and more formalised classifications of argument schemes, considering the *pros* and *cons* of the two approaches.

Keywords: discourse analysis; argumentation; topoi; schemes; Argomentum Model of Topics; pragma-dialectics; Brexit; populism.

1. Introduction

Topoi have always been at the centre of argumentation studies and several contemporary approaches exist to their classification, all in their way struggling with the tension between comprehensiveness and manageability. Some distinguish several types (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; Walton *et al.* 2008), producing long, fine-grained lists, while others, prevalently informed by logic, identify a limited number of abstract schemes (and sub-schemes) to which real instances of argumentation can be referred to (van Eemeren *et al.* 1996). Still others, as is the case with the Discourse-Historical Approach (Reisigl, Wodak 2001) are content-based and are not worried with classifications at all, deducing from the data “recurring content-related conclusion rules that are typical for specific fields of social action” (Reisigl 2014, p. 77).

This chapter considers how some of these approaches can serve the purposes of discourse analysts interested in argumentation, applying them to the analysis of arguments used *pro* and against Brexit in editorials published in UK quality newspapers. In the referendum campaign, the debate over Brexit was closely knit with the theme of populism, thus reflecting on the small scale discourses about populism circulating in academic circles and the society at large. The editorials taken into account in this paper offer an ideal object of analysis as they contributed to the creation of arguments *pro* and against Brexit, orienting public opinion both directly and interdiscursively. The patterns of reasoning featured in the editorials may, indeed, reach a larger audience than that of newspaper readers, trickling down through the mediation of TV talk-shows, radio programs, and social media. Through repetition these arguments may become ‘commonplaces’, which are interesting, from a discursive perspective, because they are the repository of a “shared social practice of argumentation” (Balkin 1996).¹ Adding to the discursive dimension an argumentative perspective may result in a more systematic analysis, where the formal, procedural aspect of topoi can contribute to highlight common discursive threads out of the many single arguments discussed in each editorial. In this way different discursive realisations may be reconstructed as variations on the same topoi, which, once identified, will form an initial mapping of prototypical patterns of reasoning deployed in discussions about populism, but also in the Europeanism vs sovereignty debate.

In the light of these considerations, and drawing on a previous study (Degano, Sicurella 2019), which considered, among other things, topoi in the Brexit debate from a purely content-based perspective, this paper will try to recast them in terms of topoi attested in the literature, testing how two approaches in particular, the pragma-dialectical (van Eemeren 2010; van Eemeren, Grotendorst 2004) and the Argumentum Model of Topoi (Rigotti 2009; Rigotti, Greco-Morasso 2010), can serve the purposes of discourse analysts.

The intent of identifying forms of argumentation typical of a given field, or of an activity type, is in line with the recent developments of pragma-dialectics, which is now oriented to exploring how different contexts create different conditions for argumentation (see van Eemeren 2010). Ultimately, identifying topoi is also a prerequisite for evaluating the quality of arguments, an aspect that goes beyond the scope of this paper, but would be worth pursuing in future developments. An increased familiarity with formal topoi may help identify flaws in reasoning, and after all, the

¹ For the use of topoi in critical discourse analysis, see also Žagar (2010).

overarching assumption behind the pragma-dialectical endeavour is that a better understanding of argumentation practices would improve the quality of discussion in contemporary democratic societies.

2. Topoi and schemes

In spite of its centrality to argumentation theory, the concept of *topos* still lacks a unified definition (see, among others, Drehe 2011; Kienpointner 1997; Rigotti, Morasso 2010).² This is partly due to an original terminological ambiguity in Aristotle's work, where the term refers both to places where arguments can be found and to 'warrants' backing the inference that leads from the premise to a conclusion (Walton *et al.* 2008, p. 275). In Aristotle's book that most deals with *topoi*, the concept is not formally defined, even though in one passage (*Topics* VIII.1, 155b4-5) *topoi* are assimilated to places from which an opponent's thesis can be attacked, that is, a starting point (Rapp 2009). In the *Topics*, *topoi* are organised according to their formal criteria, resting on relations such as genus-species, opposition, identity, verbal classification. In the *Rhetoric*, *topoi* are more 'material' in nature, and the choice of the appropriate *topos* depends not on formal criteria, but on "the content of the conclusion – whether, for example, something is said to be useful or honorable or just" (Rapp 2009).³ The realm of rhetoric is the non-compulsive, the credible, the plausible (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, pp. 1-4), reason why the arguments used in discussions falling in this dimension often rest on general premises that, differently from the universal generalisations of syllogisms, are true only to an extent. Such premises are referred to as defeasible, or enthymematic generalisations which are "true only for the most part", until an exception disproves them (Walton *et al.* 2008, pp. 230-231).⁴

In contemporary approaches, *topoi* are intended as warrants backing the logical inference that leads from premises to a conclusion (Walton *et al.* 2008, p. 275), and they co-exist with the broader notion of *schemes*. The concept of 'argumentation scheme', introduced informally by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) has been further developed and now refers to "an abstract characterisation of the way in which in a particular type of

² Synonyms of *topos* are 'topic', used in the pragma-dialectical terminology (see for example the notion of 'topical potential' introduced in the extended version of pragma-dialectics, van Eemeren 2010) and in the Argumentum Model of Topics, and the Latin equivalent *locus*, used by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958-1969)

³ <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/>

⁴ See Walton (2008, p. 230) for a terminological clarification about the term 'enthymeme', as normally intended in logic (an argument with an implicit premise or conclusion) and as, according to some scholars (for example Burnyeat 1994), originally intended by Aristotle.

argumentation a premise used in support of a standpoint is related to that standpoint in order to bring about a transfer of acceptance from that premise to the standpoint (van Eemeren *et al.* 2014, p. 19).⁵

Both *topoi* and schemes are theoretical accounts of what Wagemans calls the *acceptability transfer principle* (ATP) the inference whereby “accepting the argument renders the standpoint acceptable” (Wagemans 2010, p. 1935).⁶ In very general terms, the relation between the ATP and the other elements of an argument can be represented as follows:

- 1 STP
- 1.1 ARG
- 1.1' ATP (1.11) (Wagemans 2010, p.1935)

where, following the pragma-dialectical conventions, STP stands for standpoint (the defended proposition at the heart of a difference of opinion, or conclusion), ARG is the argument brought in support of said proposition, and ATP represents a correct way of transferring acceptability from the argument to the standpoint.

Differences exist in how contemporary approaches to argumentation formulate schemes. Walton *et al.*'s compendium, for example, rests on the traditional denominations of *major premise*, *minor premise*, and *conclusion*, as shown below with regard to the argument from cause to effect:

- Major premise:* generally, if A occurs, then B will (might) occur.
- Minor premise:* In this case A occurs (might occur)
- Conclusion:* Therefore, in this case, B will (might) occur (Walton *et al.* 2008, p. 328).

The pragma-dialectical approach formulates argumentative schemes resting on general relations (symptomatic, causal, of analogy – van Eemeren *et al.* 2002) expressed in terms of conventions derived from logic, as exemplified below with specific reference to the causal scheme:

⁵ In this respect the scheme performs the same function of classical *topoi*, according to the second meaning of the notion in Aristotle.

⁶ Akin to the concept of ATP is the notion of ‘unexpressed premise’, or ‘warrant’ in Toulmin’s model, but also the pragma-dialectical ‘pragmatic optimum’ (see Garssen 2001; Toulmin 2003, ch. 3; van Eemeren, Grootendorst 1992, ch.6.). According to Wagemans (2010, p. 1939), though, his own ATP differs in that it is a “general expression of the speaker’s commitment with regard to the justificatory force of any explicit argument”.

Y is true of X [standpoint],
 because Z is true of X [supporting argument]
 and Z leads to Y [inference linking the supporting argument and the
 conclusion, or ATP].

Differently from other approaches, where premises are represented before the conclusion, in the pragma-dialectical approach the standpoint is stated first, followed by the argument supporting it (introduced by ‘because’), while the inference backing its justificatory force is made explicit in the last line, introduced by ‘and’.

Identifying the scheme used in real-life arguments allows for an assessment of argumentation. Depending on the type of relationship (symptomatic, causal or analogy), different sets of critical questions can be asked to test the validity of an argument. This is because the critical questions associated to a scheme “capture the specific pragmatic rationale for bringing about the transition of acceptance from the premise to the standpoint” (van Eemeren *et al.* 2014, p. 19).

The pragma-dialectical argument schemes have the advantage of being general enough as to be applicable to virtually all cases of reasoning. Most argumentation schemes listed in other typologies correspond to a main type, variant or sub-type of an argumentation scheme recognized in the pragma-dialectical typology (Garssen 1997, p. 246).⁷ Differently from longer classifications of topoi, the pragma-dialectical schemes are easily memorised, adding greatly to their appeal also beyond the circle of argumentation scholars. Furthermore, although the notion of topoi is not generally included in the pragma-dialectical representation of schemes, it is not incompatible with it. As Wagemans points out, schemes and topoi can be integrated as follows:

1 Being an animal (P) is true of Socrates (R).
 1.1 Being a man (Q) is true of Socrates (R).
 1.1’ Accepting that Socrates is a man renders acceptable that Socrates is an
 animal (Q is true of R → P is true of R). [ATP]
 1.1’.1 The *topos* “What belongs to a species, also belongs to the genus”
 applies. (Wagemans 2010, p.1938)

In the Discourse Historical approach (Reisigl, Wodak 2001), the perspective is in a way reversed. Instead of looking for some unifying logical principles that underlie different realisations of a given argument, attention is paid to topoi used in discourse for their content and the attendant ideological

⁷ Garssen made this claim based on a review of the following typologies: Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca ([1958] 1969), Hastings (1962), McBurney and Mills (1964), Schellens (1985), Kienpointner (1992) and Freeley (1993).

implications. The topoi maintain their functional nature, as they serve as a rule that warrants a conclusion (Reisigl 2014, p. 84), but the conclusion rule is derived *ad hoc* rather than having regard to formalised classifications of topoi. An example of a content-based topos identified from the Discourse-Historical perspective is the “Topos of repaying the diligent and good workers/nationals”, whose conclusion rule is:

If you vote for my party, or we get the power, then the diligent and good workers will be repaid. (Reisigl 2014, p. 79)

A model that tries to accommodate both a formal concern and attention for the content is the Argomentum Model of Topics or AMT (Rigotti 2006, 2009; Rigotti, Greco Morasso 2010). Conceived as a contribution to advancing the pragma-dialectical understanding of topoi, it places emphasis on the connection between the material (content-based) starting points and the procedural (formal, or logical) starting points. At the same time, it helps identify the inferential connection at play in a given argument, thus highlighting “the source of the force of the statement presented as an argument in relation to the statement presented as a standpoint” (Rigotti, Greco Morasso 2010, p. 500). In the y-shaped AMT representation of a topos, all the elements (be they explicitly mentioned in argumentation or implicitly recoverable) are charted along two diagonal lines intersecting at a given point, representing the procedural and the material dimension respectively.




Figure 1
AMT model, adapted from Rigotti (2010, p. 508).

The procedural line sets out the topos structure, drawing on existing typologies and using the language of logic. In so doing it provides a sort of ‘roadmap’ for the reconstruction of a given example of argumentation as an instantiation of a specific topos. The material line feeds in the contents, drawing on the discourse at issue. Generally speaking, along the procedural line, the first element is the *locus*, for example, argument from analogy. Under the locus, one of the maxims deriving from it is indicated. For the sake of terminological clarity, the AMT maxim corresponds to Toulmin’s *warrant*, Kienpointner’s *Schlussregel*, and the pragma-dialectical notion of ‘argumentative principle of support’ (Garrsen 2001; van Eemeren, Grotendorst 1992). Irrespectively of the name, the maxim is the inferential connection formulated following the *if...then* convention, therefore representing the core of the topos. The maxim functions as a major premise and is formulated in abstract terms, without any reference to the specific context in which the argument is used. Under the maxim comes the minor (or second) premise, which is the point in which the procedural and the material dimensions intersect. The procedural minor premise thus provides an anchorage to the specific content and contexts of the argument. Taken together, the maxim and the minor premise support the conclusion, and the reasoning is logically valid if all premises are true. The truth of the minor premise must be derived from the external reality, that is to say, from material starting points (Rigotti, Greco Morasso 2010, p. 500), hence the intersection of the two dimensions. Along the material starting points line, another set of premises is to be found: one premise is general, the *endoxon*, representing a general belief taken as common ground to the parties, and the other is specific and factual, corresponding to Toulmin’s *datum*. The conclusion deriving from this second set of premises along the line of the material starting points, called preliminary conclusion, forms that minor premise which along with the maxim, supports the final conclusion. As Rigotti and Greco Morasso (2010 pp. 501-502) put it,

such a preliminary conclusion derives from the material starting point, but it is equally exploited by the procedural starting point being associated to the maxim as a second premise.

Figure 2 below provides an example of a topos based on analogy according to the AMT model:




Figure 2
The AMT model (Rigotti, Greco Morasso 2010, p. 499).

Here the arguer makes a forecast about the likelihood that there may be a traffic jam “tonight” (final conclusion) drawing on a previous experience of traffic jams on a similar occasion. The reasoning rests therefore on the locus from analogy, with the attendant maxim “If something was the case for something of the same functional genus as X, this may also be the case for x”. For the reasoning to be valid, two material conditions must be met: that there actually was a traffic jam on a previous situation (corresponding to the maxim’s “something was the case for something...”), and that the previous situation is comparable to the current one (corresponding to “...something of the same functional genus as X”). The preliminary conclusion affirms that both these conditions are true and serves at the same time as the maxim’s minor premise. Moving backward along the material line, the (material) minor premise and *endoxon* are meant to defend the preliminary conclusion. First, it is stated that there was a traffic jam on New Year’s Eve, which is taken as a factual *datum* acceptable as is by the other party without further need of defence; second, it is inferentially implied that the current national holiday and New Year’s Eve are comparable, on the ground of a shared understanding of big celebrations as a time when people are likely to take their cars and go for a trip (*endoxon*). At this point of the scheme, the arguer has demonstrated that something was the case for something of the same functional genus as X, thus meeting the condition expressed in the *If*-proposition of the maxim. What remains to be done is simply drawing the conclusion (corresponding to the *then*-proposition of the maxim), namely,

that there may be a traffic jam “tonight” as well (“this may be the case for x”).

Adopting pragma-dialectical conventions, the same argumentation would be reconstructed as follows:




Figure 3

Argumentation structure according to pragma-dialectical conventions.

As can be noticed, all the material starting points, whether explicit or implicit, find their way in this representation. 1.1. is equivalent to the material minor premise, while the unexpressed premises 1.1' and 1.1.1' account for the *endoxon*. The procedural starting points though, the locus and the maxim, are not represented, nor are they fully included in the attendant argument scheme:

There might be traffic jam (Y) is true of tonight (X)
 Because there being traffic jam (Y) is true of New Year's Eve (Z)
 And Tonight (X) and New Year's Eve (Z) are analogous.

The third line in the scheme above expresses the acceptability transfer principle (ATP) which is procedural and contains a reference to the type of scheme (in this case the scheme based on analogy), thus partly performing the function of the topos in the AMT model, but the maxim is unrepresented. As Rigotti and Greco Morasso put it,

what we have called the second level or maxim in the AMT is not explicitly formulated in the general representation of the argument scheme in pragma-dialectics". (Rigotti, Greco Morasso 2010, p. 507)

Some maxims, they continue, are taken into account in the “discursive description” of the different subtypes of argument schemes (Garsen 2009; van Eemeren *et al.* 2007, pp. 137). For example, a specific sub-type of

argumentation from analogy based on the “principle of justice” (Garsen 2001, p. 92) can be expressed as “people who are in similar situations should be treated similarly”, which corresponds to the maxim in the AMT’s terminology. The reason why maxims can be identified only with regard to specific subtypes of argument schemes, according to Rigotti and Greco Morasso (2010), is that “maxims are specific argumentative principles at work in concrete applications of argument schemes”. That is to say that the three main pragma-dialectical schemes are pitched too abstractly to seize the ‘warrant’ that backs the inference leading from the premises to the conclusion. By the same token, the *endoxon* is not represented in pragma-dialectical schemes, because it is necessarily context-bound.

In this paper, the AMT model will be used as an interface between formalised classifications of schemes (see the user’s compendium in Walton *et al.* 2008) and real-life arguments used in the Brexit debate, comparing its affordances with those of the pragma-dialectical scheme.

3. Materials and Method

The analysis looks at editorials about the Brexit referendum published in UK quality newspapers with different political orientations – *The Times*, *The Telegraph* and *The Guardian* – over a 6-month timespan, from April to September 2016, with the referendum held on June 23. The articles were retrieved through the Lexis-Nexis database, and their number varies considerably across newspapers, with 35 documents in the *Times*, 29 in the *Telegraph* and 81 in the *Guardian*, totalling about 156,000 words.

The search parameters limited the scope to items containing both the word *Brexit* and *populism*, since the materials were originally collected as part of a project on contemporary forms of populism in Europe. The focus was on how intellectual discourse (represented by editorials) engaged with populism, and the debate over Brexit proved an ideal object of analysis. An extremely heated and divisive topic, the referendum was closely-knit with the theme of populism, with the Leave campaign taking definitely populist tones.

In a previous stage of the study (Degano, Sicurella 2019), informal topoi were identified adopting a content-based approach, without any reference to existing classifications. When large quantities of text are considered for their discursive construction of a portion of reality, the focus is quite naturally on the content and its linguistic presentation, more than on formal patterns of reasoning. A thorough systematic reconstruction of schemes would not be viable in the early stage of the analysis but can only be attained through a sequence of steps. Initially, then, topoi were intuitively identified as commonplaces that cumulatively build up, resulting in a given

discursive construal of reality. This initial collection of topoi, unmediated by any formalised model, was meant to ward off the risk of a skewed representation of the discourse at stake, where only straightforwardly recognisable arguments would find pride of place. Matching real-life uses of argument with formalised schemes can be a daunting task for discourse analysts, whose methodological armamentarium does not generally include a thorough knowledge of topoi/argument schemes. And while inventories like Walton *et al.*'s (2008) compendium are of great help, it can be difficult to connect a real-life argument with its abstract formulation. The pragma-dialectical classification of schemes is certainly more manageable in size, but sometimes no scheme seems to be a suitable formal match for the argument at issue. As a result, an analysis carried out adopting in the first place a formal approach to schemes may produce a distorted picture, centred only on those occurrences that most obviously fit within a scheme, irrespectively of whether they are actually representative of the patterns of reasoning recurring in the discourse at stake.

A relatively large number of informal 'topoi' were identified through qualitative manual coding of the materials in Degano, Sicurella (2019). Each was assigned a code (T1 to T16) and attributed to either Remain or Leave positions, as shown in Table 1:

Pro-Remain	Pro-Leave
T1 The perversion of democracy. People must be restrained T2 A given standpoint is wrong because those who upheld it in the past were from the wrong side (fascists...) T5 Populist/ fascist/ racist slippery slope T6 Anti-right forces are not minoritarian, they only need re- engaging T10 Populism to be fought as not in line with reality T13 <i>Leave</i> campaigners are abusing the people T14 The EU as a safety net against economic disintegration and war of all against all	T3 The masses are better than what the elite think T4 The elite are too snob towards people concerns T7 The EU is not about democracy but liberalism / the free market T9 Don't call me racist if I raise legitimate concerns (e.g. strain placed on British public service by immigration) T11 <i>Leave</i> is hedging ahead in spite of <i>Remain</i> propaganda (right because people vote for it) T12 The EU is antidemocratic T15 Disagreeing with the EU is perfectly reasonable T16 The EU is perceived as being about free trade and liberalism, but in fact it is the opposite (limits growth and capitalism)

Table 1
 Editorials on Brexit and populism – Preliminary list of informal 'topoi'.

The commonplaces thus identified were then grouped into fewer reasoning patterns, worded following the Discourse-Historical approach conventions. For example, T5, T10 and T13 would go under the *Topos of populism as manipulation, scapegoating, and fearmongering*, which was formulated as:

If populist rhetoric relies on unfair practices of consensus construction (such as manipulation, scapegoating, and fearmongering), then sensible people must reject it.

Some realizations of this are shown below, with italics added to highlight the most salient parts:

- (1) By polling day what else will we be left with at home? ... having to cope with the *swelling of a sour, xenophobic English nationalism masquerading as the liberation of the nation's mojo* (to use Michael Gove's language). (*The Guardian*, June 8, 2016)
- (2) The Brexit campaign channelled this anger and focused it on a *bunch of non sequiturs*. Its leaders *misled millions, as populists always do*, by *claiming* that destroying international collaboration, stopping immigration and reasserting indigenous culture would somehow deepen democracy and make people better off. (*The Guardian*, August 1, 2016)
- (3) How is it possible that a *billionaire bigot can present himself as the voice of the people*, a brave truth teller speaking up for the little guy? How have we allowed *xenophobes and racists to posture as advocates for democracy*? (*The Guardian*, June 29, 2016)

Threads T3 (The masses are better than what the elite think), T4 (The elite are too snob towards people concerns), and T9 (Don't call me racist if I raise legitimate concerns such as the strain placed on British public service by immigration) have been grouped under the *Topos of people legitimately turning to populist parties*, whose rule reads

If mainstream politics lets people down, then people turn to populist parties.

Through this topos, mainstream politics is explicitly or implicitly urged to acknowledge the problems on which populism thrives, instead of ignoring or dismissing them as the result of manipulation. Examples are given below:

- (4) [...] We should not give an inch to the bigotry resurging in both Britain and the US, just as we shouldn't give any ground to the anti-immigrant xenophobes in Australia. *But to fight their hatred, we must – as a matter of urgency – articulate a progressive opposition to the conditions breeding such deep alienation.* (*The Guardian*, June 20, 2016)
- (5) It's a traditional argument of the right, an entirely conventional fear of the

ignorant masses and an entirely conventional plea for their stewardship by their betters. But over the last few days, it's been articulated again and again by liberals desperately floating ideas *as to how a clearly expressed popular sentiment might be overturned*. Nothing could be more disastrous. (*The Guardian*, June 26, 2016)

- (6) [...] Roland Dacre Rudd [Remain] is a classic example of a privileged breed which is *treating the views of ordinary, less fortunate Britons during this referendum with lofty disdain*. His father was a stockbroker (of course), he went to public school (obviously) and Oxford where he was President of the Union (natch). The former European Commissioner Lord! (Peter) Mandelson is godfather to one of Rudd's children, who will never struggle to get into their first, second or third choice of secondary school due to uncontrolled EU migration (just a hunch). (*The Telegraph*, June 4, 2016)

Drawing on the preliminary identification of informal topoi, this paper will try to find a formalised counterpart for them in Walton *et al.*'s compendium of schemes (2008). The schemes thus identified will be reconstructed using the AMT model, and, for the sake of comparison, one of them will be reconstructed also according to the pragma-dialectical approach, weighing their *pros* and *cons* from a discursive perspective.

4. Analysis

The analysis will now proceed asking whether some of the topoi previously identified, as illustrated in the Material and Method Section, can be seen as context-specific realizations of any formalized scheme.

4.1. *Topos of populism as manipulation, scapegoating, and fearmongering*

A first correspondence is tentatively identified between the *Topos of populism as manipulation, scapegoating, and fearmongering* and topos 41 'ethotic argument' (Walton *et al.* 2008, p. 336), which goes like this:

Major premise: if x is a person of bad moral character, then what x says should be rejected as less plausible.

Minor premise: x is a person of bad moral character

Conclusion: Therefore, what x says should be rejected as less plausible

This topos rests on a shared evaluation of a given characteristic of the other party, which is taken as symptomatic for their lack of reliability. Accusing the leaders of the Leave campaign of manipulation, fearmongering and scapegoating casts them as morally objectionable people, insofar as all such practices imply distorting facts with a deceitful intent. The ethos of the Leave

leaders is thus brought to bear directly on the validity of their arguments; it is not their conduit in other fields of life that is taken as an indicator of their unreliability, as would be the case with *ad-hominem* topoi, but their lack of sincerity with regard to the merits of the discussion.

Following the AMT model conventions, the argument can be reconstructed as follows:




Figure 4
Ethotic argument.

In the maxim deriving from the ethotic argument used here, a pivotal role is played by the negative judgement passed on a ‘person of bad moral character’ – in the specific case, rather a group of people, namely the populist leaders of the Leave side. Those who use this argument must in the first place be confident that 1) the audience will be willing to accept this judgement, and 2) on these grounds, they will reject Leave’s position altogether. Seeing to it that this judgement is accepted is the ‘job’ of the material starting points, and the daily allegations of manipulation levelled against Leave arguments by Remain leaders and political commentators from the beginning of the campaign may have bestowed factuality on this point. The proposition that Leave leaders rest on manipulation, fearmongering and scapegoating is then used as a material minor premise, which together with the hardly challengeable *endoxon* that these are despicable practices in a democracy, leads to the preliminary conclusion that Leave populist leaders are of bad

moral character. The condition set by the maxim (if X is a person of bad moral character) is thus proved to be the case, and therefore it can be concluded that Leave positions should be rejected.

From a discursive point of view, what is challenged here is the truthfulness of Leave leaders' claims, and not the merits of their claims. This topos, focusing attention on how despicable populists are, fails to acknowledge problems that populist sympathizers feel as real. Saying that populists are manipulative, for example, implies that problems are not real, but are conjured up by those who want to exploit them politically to get easy consensus. The minor premise that populist leaders campaigning for Leave are lying is likely to be accepted as an object of agreement only by those who already subscribe to an anti-populist, pro-Remain position. Even if evidence of manipulation was brought forth (which was the case) and managed, at best, to tarnish the reputation of the Leave campaign leaders, this did not affect the issues that their voters perceive as problematic. A leader with a tarnished reputation claiming to want to solve a problem may still come through as more appealing than a leader who denies that the problem exists altogether. If the point of argumentation is solving a difference of opinion, and to do so it is necessary to rest on some common starting points, failing to agree on the existence of the problem in the first place preempts any possibility of a dialectical exchange. It sounds more like an attempt not to engage in argumentation on its merits (Mohammed 2017) for lack of good arguments.⁸

Considering also the 'depreciation' of truth within the populist camp in the so-called 'post-truth era', where it is assumed that data are continuously manipulated by the elite, argumentation based on the first topos is unlikely to appeal to populist voters. It seems rather to serve an epideictic function (Degano 2020), aiming to strengthen bonds and beliefs within the community of convinced Remainers, as opposed to winning consensus from outside.

4.2. Topos of people legitimately turning to populism

Another connection can be made between the Topos of people legitimately turning to populism (*If mainstream politics lets people down, then people turn to populist parties*) and topos 34. Pragmatic argument from alternatives (Walton *et al.* 2008, p. 318), which reads as:

Premise I: Either you (the respondent) must bring about A, or B will occur

Premise II: B is bad or undesirable, from your point of view

⁸ This goes in a similar direction as that held by Mohammed (2017) in her analysis of accusations of inconsistency addressed by prime ministers to their adversaries in PM question time. As she points out, it is not reasonable enough to dismiss an issue by arguing that the issue should not become an object of debate, without taking position towards it (Mohammed 2017, p. 131).

Conclusion: Therefore, you should (ought to, practically speaking) bring about A

Having recourse to the AMT representation conventions, the topic can be reconstructed as follows:




Figure 5
Pragmatic argument from alternatives.

Considering the roles envisaged by the maxims, ‘you’ refers to mainstream parties, especially the Labour Party who traditionally used to defend the interests of the lower classes; A stands for ‘defending the interests of traditional Labour voters’, and B is equivalent to ‘the shift of votes from Labour to populist positions’. What the maxim topicalises is failure: it is failure to accomplish a given action (A) which determines an alternative state of things (B). The material starting points are meant to demonstrate that the Labour Party has failed to defend the interests of its traditional voters, which in the Brexit discourse (and in populist discourse at large) is often done by representing national weaker groups as direct competitors of immigrants, and casting left-wing parties as the champions of immigrants’ rights to the detriment of national working classes, whom they supposedly represent. After all, immigration was one of the decisive topics of the campaign, with

the EU free circulation policy seen as the main obstacle to a proper control of UK borders. The *endoxon*, in this case, is potentially more controversial than the one discussed with regard to the ethotic argument. It establishes the principle that both immigration and EU circulation policies are antithetical to the interests of the lower classes, as it is in their communities that the impact of immigration is felt most. If one accepts that the Labour Party's traditional pro-EU stance is particularly detrimental for its traditional voters, then the preliminary conclusion that Labour has failed to defend their main stakeholders' interest can be taken as defended, and the reasoning can be concluded. To recap, following the syntax set out by the maxim, if mainstream parties, and the Labour party in particular, fail to defend the interests of traditional Labour voters, which is the case as shown by the party's support for EU free circulation policy, then Labour voters may understandably turn to an alternative political force such as populism.

This topos is used to explain voters' preference for populist leaders as a plausible choice, as opposed to being an irrational despicable stance dictated by gut feelings. The other party in the discussion are those who, missing the point, blame the voters that have turned their back on the party they traditionally supported (namely the Labour Party) instead of the party that let them down. This topos differs substantially from the ethotic arguments discussed above, as it acknowledges the concerns of the voters. Such concerns are cast as a reasonable starting point, even though this does not necessarily entail an endorsement of populist leaders. Such an acknowledgement makes it possible for the editorialist to engage readers who may hold a grudge against Europe, while possibly marking their distance from populist Leavers in terms of how the problem should be solved.

5. Discussion

From a methodological point of view, a comparison of the AMT and the pragma-dialectical approach is in order to highlight the respective *pros* and *cons*. Taking just one of the topoi considered so far as an example, namely the Topos of people legitimately turning to populism (*If mainstream politics lets people down, then people turn to populist parties*), the pragma-dialectical reconstruction is as follows:

1. Voters' behaviour (turning to populist parties) is a natural consequence of mainstream parties' behavior
 - 1.1 mainstream parties have let people down
 - (1.1') if mainstream parties let people down, people will turn to other forms of politics promising to defend their interests
 - 1.1.1 mainstream parties support for EU policies has favoured illegal immigration

(1.1.1' illegal immigration is especially threatening for the working class)

The underlying scheme justifying the transition from the premise (1.1) to the conclusion is causal, and can be represented as:

(Y) turning to populism is true of (X) former voters of mainstream politics
Because (Z) being let down by mainstream politics is true of (X) former voters
of mainstream parties
And (Z) being let down by mainstream politics leads to (Y) turning to
populism

As the pragma-dialectical reconstruction shows, the result is not substantially different from the one achieved through the AMT model, insofar as both permit to identify the inference warranting the transition from the argument to the standpoint. In the AMT model the inference is made explicit by the maxim, while according to the pragma-dialectical scheme the inference is expressed in the third line of the scheme ('and being let down by...'). The same inference can be represented also in the reconstruction of argumentation as an implicit premise (see 1.1' above). However, the AMT model requires greater explicitation, due to its distinction between procedural and material starting points. The identification of the locus and the maxim deriving from it, in particular, can guide the analyst in the reconstruction of the argument, as the procedural dimension provides a more solid scaffolding for the reconstruction of the argument. Furthermore, the simple fact of deriving the maxim from a locus makes it possible to match real-life arguments with existing classifications of *topoi*, which can be useful when it comes to identifying the subtypes of the three main pragma-dialectical schemes. Finally, the AMT model embraces at once the argumentation structure (identifying conclusion and premises) and the kind of relation that justifies the transition from the premises to the conclusion. The pragma-dialectical reconstruction, instead, tackles the two aspects separately, as shown above, with the argument scheme reconstructed apart.

On the other hand, the pragma-dialectical scheme makes it easier to verify the correctness of one's reconstruction hypothesis; if the referents of Y, X, and Z are identified and formulated correctly, the rigidity of the scheme helps confirm the appropriateness of the reconstruction. If all the elements of the real-life argument fit in the scheme, this is a strong indicator that the argument (in both its explicit and implicit components) was properly reconstructed. Secondly, the pragma-dialectical conventions (see Fig. 3) allow for a more synthetic and comprehensive reconstruction of complex argumentation. The same would not be feasible with the AMT model, which focuses on one *topos* at a time, just like pragma-dialectical schemes. Finally, the three main pragma-dialectical schemes allow for a coarse-grained initial categorisation, which can then be refined looking for schemes that are

subtypes of that category. With regard to the argument above, one could say that the argument from alternatives is a subtype of causal reasoning typical of political discourse, insofar as it defends the view that if one party fails to accomplish what voters need, people will (or should) turn to other parties. The identification of such subtypes can result from the analysis of prototypical argumentative patterns, that is to say patterns that recur and are representative of a given domain or genre (van Eemeren 2017). As lists of prototypical patterns are produced with regard to specific genres, they would provide discourse analysts with an interface between longer lists of schemes and the actual examples they have intuitively identified in their texts.

An important aspect from a discursive viewpoint is evaluation; for example, the *topos of people legitimately turning to populist parties* implies a disapproving attitude towards mainstream politics, and the Labour Party in particular, for failing in their mission. Neither the AMT model nor the pragma-dialectical scheme fully capture this evaluative aspect: both the argument from alternatives and the causal scheme point out a relation between a cause and an effect, therefore falling in the category of epistemic standpoints. The AMT model representation, however, seems to cater better for this specific interest of discourse analysis, showing that there is a mismatch between an expected behaviour (expressed in the *endoxon* slot) and an observed behaviour (conveyed by the material second premise), which paves the way for a negative evaluation.

Furthermore, the AMT model might contribute to the discourse analyst's agenda in another important way, which is not dealt with in this paper, but is worth mentioning. If argumentation is seen from the discursive perspective, it would be desirable to go beyond single texts and analyse entire corpora representative of a given strand of discourse. One hindrance in this respect has been the scarcity of research on linguistic indicators, words that might help retrieve a given discursive, or argumentative, aspect through corpus interrogation softwares. Existing studies have focused on words related to the procedural aspects of reasoning. For example, words like 'compare/compared', 'similar', 'equivalent', 'parallels', 'remind(s)' can be indicators of argumentation based on analogy (van Eemeren *et al.* 2007, p. 141). However, the procedural aspects of reasoning are often implicit, and people may be using an argument without linguistically codifying the relation on which it rests (Degano 2016). Sometimes, though, the problem is simply that the indicators cited in the literature are too general, while field-specific indicators, which might be more reliable, are not available in ready-made classifications. Starting from existing classifications of schemes or topics, and applying them to specific fields of discourse, one might find several potential indicators not only of a procedural, but also of a material nature. This is in line with Bigi and Greco Morasso's view (2012) that some

linguistic units, which following in Firth's tradition (1957) they call 'keywords', provide a link to context-specific shared premises in argumentation, functioning as the *endoxon* for a given argument scheme. With regard to the topoi discussed above, one might hypothesise that words like 'manipulation', 'fear', and 'xenophobia' could be indicators of the ethotic *topos of populism as manipulation, scapegoating, and fearmongering*, while words like 'immigrants/immigration', 'working-class' might point to uses of the pragmatic argument from alternatives instantiated in the *topos of people legitimately turning to populism*.

6. Conclusion

The analysis has made it possible to match some of the informal topoi used in the debate over Brexit and populism with more formalised topoi attested in the literature, and at the same time to compare the pragma-dialectical notion of schemes and the AMT model, discussing what benefits each could offer to discourse analysts. On the one hand, the pragma-dialectical threefold classification of schemes (symptomatic, causal, and based on analogy) is both comprehensive and manageable, and can have an initial orientating function for a scholar struggling to match real-life arguments with the rigour of theoretical accounts of arguments. However, such a classification is necessarily coarse-grained, and for a more fine-tuned analytic tool one should have recourse to the sub-types of reasoning for each main category. Further research in this direction is needed, as made clear by Walton and Macagno when saying that "the literature on classification of argumentation schemes is still very new, and so it seems hard to know the best way to proceed". (Walton, Macagno 2016, p. 9). Resting on existing classifications of topoi/schemes, and setting them in relation with given genres, in line with the pragma-dialectical agenda of identifying prototypical argumentative patterns, could be a promising approach. On the other hand, forcing real-life arguments into the pragma-dialectical schemes can prove difficult, as it requires a substantial rewording that is not necessarily intuitive, and can prove frustrating for outsiders to argumentation. Discourse analysts may find it easier to rely on repertoires collecting several fine-grained schemes, whose variety increases the chances of finding a suitable match for a topos used in real-life discourse.

As for the AMT model, at first sight it can appear even less user-friendly than the pragma-dialectical schemes, but it has the advantage of providing slots where the premises of the traditional representation of schemes can be filled in, allowing a greater interaction between traditional typologies of topoi and contemporary approaches to them. The one-line space devoted to the principle of support (or acceptability transfer principle) in the

pragma-dialectical formulation of schemes is here unpacked into a topic and a maxim. The level of the maxim seems to provide a good balance between the abstract level of the locus (or the even more abstract level of the pragma-dialectical main type of reasoning) and the context-specific usage of a given topos, which is crucial for discourse analysts. As Wagemans and Hitchcock (2011) point out, focusing on the maxim would facilitate the formulation of the unexpressed premise in argument schemes, which in turn would expand our understanding of sub-types of schemes. At the same time, resting on the AMT would allow a more systematic categorization of schemes used in given fields of discourse, obviating the sprawling proliferation of topoi that would derive from the purely content-based approach adopted by discourse studies. The results of studies on argumentative topoi from different disciplinary perspectives may thus become more readily comparable, enabling researchers to leverage on each other's insights. With regard to the data presented here, adopting a more formalised approach has made it possible to identify two recurrent topoi of the discourse about Brexit and populism. One is based on the ethotic argument (a subtype of the symptomatic scheme), while the other rests on the locus from alternatives (a subtype of the causal scheme). Ethotic arguments invite people to reject a conclusion on the ground that those who support it are not worth trusting. In the Brexit debate this amounted to claiming that Leave was not an option because those who campaigned for it were populist, and as such, manipulative. In this way, undecided voters with a mild Leave inclination, were not engaged at all. Their concerns were cast as the fruit of manipulation, and hence negated, thus ruling out the possibility of a preliminary agreement on the premises (for example that those voters' concerns were legitimate to an extent) which is crucial to profitably engage in argumentation. The function of this argument, then, appeared mostly to reinforce the conviction and the sense of belonging of those who already had a pro-European stance. The locus from alternatives, on the other hand, presents a given course of action as a logical consequence of someone else's failure to act. In this way, the growing consensus for Leave and populism is seen as a consequence of mainstream parties (and particularly the Labour Party) to defend the working class in the face of external threats. Such a framing made it possible to acknowledge the concerns of those who blamed their insecurity on the European Union, and therefore saw Leave as a solution to their problem. This argument was used not to support Leave, but to criticize the stigmatization of Leave, and hence of their voters, on the part of pro-Remain commentators. It was mostly relied on by progressive and pro-Remain editorialists warning their fellow Remainers of the risk that their entrenchment behind an outright condemnation of populism/Leave would preempt any possibility of dialogue with those who were to be won back to the pro-Remain camp.

Further research may confirm whether the patterns identified here can be considered prototypical of the public debate in Europe about populism, sovereignty and Europeanism. Another possible development would be the identification of linguistic indicators of argumentation related to field-specific topoi, which in turn might facilitate the application of corpus linguistics to the analysis of argumentation. The AMT model, with its explicitation of premises, might help to highlight lexical indicators associated with material premises recurrently used in a given field.

To conclude, the AMT model's emphasis on the explicitation of implicit contents and inferences helps to assess the quality and the effectiveness of argumentation, which after all should be the point of all the reconstruction efforts. The reconstruction of the loci, maxims and material starting points for the two formalised topoi above adds clarity to the analysis and highlights their weaknesses or strengths, in terms of potentially engaging an audience who starts from different positions. Implicit values and beliefs constitute the objects of agreement for argumentation, and may thus account for the effectiveness of strategic manoeuvring on a par with, and possibly even more than, procedural soundness. As such, they are *per se* worthy of attention and are potentially more important to discourse analysts than the explicitly codified contents.

Bionote: Chiara Degano (PhD) is associate professor of English Linguistics and Translation at Roma 3 University, Italy. Her research is centred on discourse analysis, integrated with the quantitative approach of corpus linguistics and with aspects of argumentation theory. She is a member of ILIAS - International Learned Institute for Argumentation Studies, and CLAVIER - Corpus and Language Variation in English Research Group, and sits on the editorial board of the *Journal of Argumentation in Context*. Within this framework she has focused on various strands of institutional communication, including media, political, business and legal discourse. She has published two monographs: *Discorsi di guerra: il prologo del conflitto iracheno nella stampa britannica e italiana* [War Discourses: The Prologue to the Iraqi conflict in the British and Italian Press] (2008), and *Discourse Analysis, Argumentation Theory and Corpus Linguistics. An integrated Approach* (2012).

Author's address: chiara.degano@uniroma3.it

References

- Balkin J.M. 1996, *A Night in the Topics*, in Brooks P. and Gewirtz P. (eds.), *Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Bigi S. and Greco Morasso S. 2012, *Keywords, Frames and the Reconstruction of Material Starting Points in Argumentation*, in “Journal of Pragmatics” 44, pp. 1135-1149.
- Burnyeat M.F. 1994, *Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion*, in Furley D. and Nehemas A. (eds.), *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., pp. 3-55.
- Degano C. 2016, *Corpus Linguistics and Argumentation*, in “Journal of Argumentation in Context” 5 [2], pp.113-138.
- Degano C. 2020, *Populism and the Press: Contracting and Expanding (Dis)agreement Space in UK Editorials on Brexit*, in Garzone G., Logaldo M. and Santulli F. (eds.), *Investigating Conflict Discourse in the Periodical Press*, Peter Lang, Bern, pp. 33-50.
- Degano C. and Sicurella F.G. 2019, *A Dialogue on Populism?*, in Breeze R. and Zienkowski J. (eds.), *Imagining the Peoples of Europe: Populist Discourses across the Political Spectrum*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, pp. 43-72.
- Douglas W. and Macagno F. 2016, *A Classification System for Argumentation Schemes*, in “Argument & Computation” 6 [3], pp.1-27.
- Drehe I. 2011, *The Aristotelian Dialectical Topos*, in “Argumentum” 9 [2], pp. 129-139.
- Freeley A.J. 1993, *Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making* (8th ed.), Wadsworth, Belmont, CA.
- Garssen B.J. 1997, *Argumentatieschema's in Pragma-Dialectisch Perspectief: Een Theoretisch En Empirisch Onderzoek* [Argumentation Schemes in a Pragma-Dialectical Perspective: A Theoretical and Empirical Study], IFOTT, Amsterdam.
- Garssen B.J. 2001, *Argument Schemes*, in van Eemeren F.H. (ed.), *Crucial Concepts in Argumentation Theory*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, pp. 81-99.
- Garssen B. 2009, *Comparing the Incomparable: Figurative Analogies in a Dialectical Testing Procedure*, in van Eemeren F.H. and Garssen B. (eds.), *Pondering on Problems of Argumentation*, Springer, New York, pp. 133-140.
- Hastings A.C. 1962, *A Reformulation of the Modes of Reasoning in Argumentation*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.
- Hitchcock D. and Wagemans J. 2011, *The Pragma-Dialectical Account of Argumentation Schemes*, in Feteris E.T., Garssen B. and Snoeck Henkemans F. (eds.), *Keeping in Touch with Pragma-Dialectics, in Honor of Frans H. van Eemeren*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, pp. 189-206.
- Kienpointner M. 1992, *Alltagslogic: Struktur Und Funktion Von Argumentationsmustern*, Frommann Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt.
- Kienpointner M. 1997, *On the Art of Finding Arguments: What Ancient and Modern Masters of Invention Have to Tell Us about the 'Ars Inveniendi'*, in “Argumentation” 11 [2], pp. 225-236.
- Martin J.R. and White P.R.R. 2005, *The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English*, Palgrave, New York.
- McBurney J.H. and Mills G.E. 1964, *Argumentation and Debate: Techniques of a Free Society*, Macmillan, New York.

- Mohammed D. 2017, *Argumentation in Prime Minister's Question Time. Accusation of Inconsistency in Response to criticism*. John Benjamins, Amsterdam.
- Perelman C. and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. [1958] 1969, *La Nouvelle Rhétorique: Traité De L'argumentation*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris; translated by Wilkinson J. and Weaver P. *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise On Argumentation* 1969, University of Notre Dame, Press Notre Dame, IN.
- Rapp C. 2009, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ad vocem*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/>
- Reisigl M. 2014, *Argumentation Analysis and the Discourse-Historical Approach. A Methodological Framework*, in Hart C. and Cap P. (eds.), *Contemporary Critical Discourse Studies*, Bloomsbury, London, pp. 67-96.
- Reisigl M. and Wodak R. 2001, *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*, Routledge, London.
- Rigotti E. 2006, *Relevance of Context-bound loci to Topical Potential in the Argumentation Stage*, in "Argumentation" 20, pp. 519-540.
- Rigotti E. 2009, *Whether and how Classical Topics Can Be Revived in the Contemporary Theory of Argumentation*, in van Eemeren F.H. and Garssen, B. (eds.), *Pondering on Problems of Argumentation*, Springer, New York, pp. 157-178.
- Rigotti E. and Greco Morasso S. 2010, *Comparing the Argumentum Model of Topics to other Contemporary Approaches to Argument Schemes: The Procedural and Material Components*, in "Argumentation" 24, pp. 489-512.
- Schellens P.J. 1985, *Redelijke Argumenten: Een Onderzoek Naar Normen Voor Kritische Lezers* [Reasonable Argumentation: A Study Of Norms For A Critical Reader]. Foris, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
- Toulmin S.E. 2003, *The Uses of Argument*. Updated Edition. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- van Eemeren F.H. 2010, *Strategic Maneuvering In Argumentative Discourse: Extending The Pragma-Dialectical Theory Of Argumentation*, John Benjamins, Amsterdam, Philadelphia.
- van Eemeren F.H. (ed.) 2017, *Prototypical Argumentative Patterns. Exploring the Relationship Between Argumentative Discourse and Institutional Context*. Amsterdam, Philadelphia, John Benjamins.
- van Eemeren F.H., Garssen B., Krabbe E.C.W., Snoeck Henkemans A.F., Verheij B. and Wagemans J. H. M. 2014, *Handbook of Argumentation Theory*, Springer, Dordrecht.
- van Eemeren F.H. and Grootendorst R. 1992, *Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective*, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.
- van Eemeren F.H. and Grootendorst R. 2004, *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- van Eemeren F.H., Grootendorst R. and Snoeck Henkemans F. 1996, *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of Historical Background and Contemporary Developments*, Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
- van Eemeren F.H., Grootendorst R. and Snoeck Henkemans F. 2002, *Argumentation: Analysis, Evaluation, Presentation*, Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
- van Eemeren F.H., Houtlosser P. and Snoeck Henkemans A. F. 2007, *Argumentative indicators in discourse: A pragma-dialectical study*, Springer, Dordrecht.
- Wagemans J. 2010, *Argument Schemes, Topoi and Laws of Logic*, in 2010 ISSA Proceedings, <http://Rozenbergquarterly.Com/Issa-Proceedings-2010-Argument-Schemes-Topoi-And-Laws-Of-Logic/> (7.10.2019).
- Walton D., Reed C. and Macagno F. 2008, *Argumentation Schemes*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

- Walton D. and Macagno F. 2016, *A Classification System for Argumentation Schemes*, in “Argument & Computation” 6 [3], pp. 219-245.
- Žagar I. Ž 2010, *Topoi in Critical Discourse Analysis*, in “Lodz Papers in Pragmatics” 6 [1], pp. 3-27.